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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of Judge David E. 
Roth heard in the Second Judicial District in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, concerning the title to real property. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case involves a determination as to the title of 
real property. The appellants claim that the property was 
conveyed by Deed to be held in trust for them. The respondents 
claim they hold both legal and equitable title to the property by 
reason of Deed subject only to a life estate in the appellants. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiffs/appellants filed a Complaint against the 
defendants/respondents in the Weber County District Court. The 
matter was tried, non-jury, before Judge David E. Roth on the 
25th and 26th of May, 1988. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment was signed by Judge Roth on the 21st day of 
June, 1988. 
The plaintiffs/appellants appealed to Utah Supreme 
Court on the 21st day of July, 1988. This matter was transferred 
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on the 6th 
day of February, 1989. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The district court judge, David E. Roth, setting 
without a jury, entered a judgment in this matter on the 21st day 
of June, 1988. The court found that the defendants/respondents 
own the Fee Title to the real property in question subject to a 
life estate in the plaintiffs/appellants. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
The plaintiff/appellants, hereinafter referred to as 
the appellants, are Joseph Opheikens and his wife Fanny 
Opheikens. The defendants/respondents, hereinafter referred to 
as the respondents, are Arthur C. Sheron and his wife Barbara 0. 
Sheron. The parties will be referred to by appellants and 
respondents and by their names in order to identify the source of 
some of the testimony. Reference will be made to the page number 
of the court record rather than to the page number of the 
transcript. 
The appellants are the parents of the respondent, 
Barbara 0. Sheron, and at the time of the trial were 80 years of 
age. (Record, p.231) Prior to 1953, Barbara Sheron had been 
married to an individual by the name of Jack Griven. He died in 
an automobile accident in 1953 and as a result of that accident 
Barbara Sheron received $1,900.00 and an insurance policy that 
paid her $92.90 per month. After the death of her first husband, 
Barbara Sheron and her daughter from that marriage, Kathleen, 
lived with the appellants. (R.315) Upon receiving the $1,900.00 
from the death of her first husband, Barbara Sheron suggested 
that the appellants build a home on a lot they owned. Barbara 
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Sheron used the $1,900.00 she had received from her husband's 
death to construct the home. In addition, she worked along side 
her father during the entire construction of the home. (R.316-
317) The appellants borrowed $4,500.00 from Froerer Corporation 
to finish the home and at a later time borrowed an additional 
$700.00 from Froerer Corporation to install cabinets in the home. 
(R.239) Barbara Sheron paid $92.90 on the mortgage borrowed by 
the appellants for a period of one year. She and her new 
husband, Arthur C. Sheron, lived in the home for a period of 
three months after it was constructed. (R.318-319) The 
respondents moved to a home that was adjacent to the property on 
which the new home had been built and which the appellants were 
occupying. 
The appellant, Fanny Opheikens, handled all the 
financial matters for her family. (R.232) Fanny Opheikens liked 
to gamble and played Bingo seven nights a week. (R.320-321) She 
used the money from her husband's paycheck to cover her gambling 
losses and consequently became delinquent in the moneys owed on 
the mortgages and taxes on the home. In 1957 Froerer demanded 
payment of the $700.00 which had been loaned to the appellants to 
install the cabinets. The appellants were unable to provide the 
money so the respondents borrowed the money and paid the debt to 
Froerer. (R.319-320, 364-365) Froerer made the demand on the 
$700.00 because the appellant, Fanny Opheikens had not been 
making the interest and/or mortgage payments required under the 
mortgage and the loan on the $700.00. Between June of 1958 and 
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December of 1967 the appellants had paid nothing towards the 
principal on the home mortgage• (Exhibit 12, R.282) When the 
respondents paid the $700.00, Froerer reinstated the mortgage, 
but increased the monthly payments to $110.00 per month. (R.364) 
In approximately December of 1967, the appellant Fanny 
Opheikens informed the respondents that the house was being 
foreclosed by Froerer because she had not paid taxes for a period 
of five years. The property had been advertised and placed for 
sale for delinquent taxes by the county. (R.321-322) A 
neighbor, Elizabeth Dale, who was a close friend of the 
appellant Joseph Opheikens, also became aware of the fact that 
the property was being placed for a tax sale and was interested 
in purchasing the home. (R.417) The respondent Arthur Sheron 
met with the appellant Joseph Opheikens and suggested that the 
respondents would acquire the money to pay the taxes which 
amounted to $1,028.00. Joseph Opheikens informed the respondent 
that he was a damn fool and that he should let Froerer have the 
home. (R.367) The respondents borrowed $1,028*00 from Joe 
Deemer and agreed to pay the taxes on the condition that the 
appellants would deed the home over to them. The appellant Fanny 
Opheikens suggested that a Quit Claim Deed be drafted by her 
attorney Ira Huggins. (R.368-369) A deed was drafted by 
attorney Ira Huggins at a meeting between Mr. Huggins, Fanny 
Opheikens, and Arthur Sheron. At that time Attorney Huggins 
informed Fanny Opheikens that if she signed the deed she would be 
giving up all ownership to the home to the respondents. (R.369-
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370) The deed was then taken back to Joseph Opheikens and the 
appellants signed the deed the next day in front of a notary. 
(R.370) The respondents told the appellants that they could 
continue to live in the house during their lifetime if they would 
pay the remaining mortgage and taxes on the home. The 
respondents paid the insurance on the home. (R.372-373, 325-326) 
The appellants had represented to the respondents and 
to others that they always intended the home to go to their 
daughter Barbara Sheron and to her oldest daughter Kathleen Lilly 
because the home had been built from the insurance money received 
from the death of Barbara's first husband and Kathleen's father. 
(R.318, 363) The appellants deny that they made any such 
statements. However, other witnesses testified that they had 
heard the appellants make the statements. One of those witnesses 
was Elizabeth Dale, an old time friend of the appellants who had 
known them since 1957, and had social contact with them daily. 
(R.412-413) Elizabeth Dale testified that Joseph Opheikens told 
her on a number of occasions that the home was to belong to 
Barbara and her oldest daughter because of the insurance money 
that had been invested in the home. (R.415-416) Elizabeth Dale 
testified that she had been told by the appellant Joseph 
Opheikens that he would not have a roof over his head if it had 
not been for what the respondents had done for him. (R.420-421) 
Kathleen Lilly testified that she recalled hearing her 
grandmother say the house was to go to her and her mother Barbara 
Sheron because it was built with blood money. (R.443-444) Vanna 
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Sandburg, the daughter of Arthur and Barbara Sheron, testified 
that she was close to her grandparents and that her grandmother 
would make a point of telling her that the home after the 
appellants death would be going to Barbara Sheron and Vanna's 
sister Kathleen Lilly. (R.454) 
The Quit Claim Deed deeding the property from the 
appellants to the respondents was signed on the 7th day December, 
1967. (Ex.1) The respondents from that time on maintained the 
yard, plowed the snow, built a patio, and performed other work on 
the property for which they did not charge the appellants. 
(R. 331-332, 374-375, 447) The respondents did not have any 
complaints from the appellants until approximately 1984 when they 
received a letter from an attorney representing the appellants 
claiming that they held the home in trust for the appellants. 
(R.330) The respondents refused to turn the house over to the 
appellants and the appellants filed a Complaint in this matter. 
The Complaint alleged that the respondents were holding the house 
in trust for the appellants. However, the appellant Joseph 
Opheikens testified at the trial that he had never informed the 
respondents that they were holding the house in trust for him. 
(R.229) The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified that she had 
asked that the home be returned to the appellants, but the 
respondents said they would not do so. (R.299) Fanny Opheikens 
testified that when the Deed was executed, she did not have a 
close relationship with her daughter and had an uncomfortable 
relationship with her son-in-law. She also testified that she 
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did not have a confidential relationship with either of the 
respondents. (R.295-296) Joseph Opheikens was very confused in 
his testimony and stated that the whole matter was a puzzle to 
him. (R.221) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS OWN THE FEE TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY. 
The respondents received a Quit Claim Deed from the 
appellants for the real property in question on the 7th day of 
December, 1967. (Ex.1) Judge Roth, after hearing this case, 
entered a judgment which stated in part, "It is hereby ordered 
that the defendants own the Fee Title to the following described 
property subject to a life estate in Joseph Opheikens and Fanny 
Opheikens;..." The Court in its bench ruling stated as follows: 
One fact I can find for certain, and that is 
that in my opinion, based upon the evidence, 
the plaintiffs did quit claim their interest 
to this property to the defendants. That the 
claimed document is clear on its face. And 
there is no question as to what its effect 
is. And I am satisfied that both plaintiffs 
signed that deed. There is no evidence that 
in 1967 that either plaintiff was in poor 
health or of unsound mind. (R.470) 
Paragraph 3 of the original Complaint and of the Amended 
Complaint of the appellants acknowledges that the appellants 
executed a deed to the respondents. That allegation was admitted 
by the respondents in their answer. Judge Roth ruled at the 
beginning of the trial that the appellants had admitted that they 
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had executed the deed and that would not be an issue during the 
trial. (R.193-195) 
In Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984) the 
Supreme Court said that there is a presumption of validity upon 
the delivery of a deed and that a party attacking the validity of 
a written instrument such as a deed must do so by clear and 
convincing evidence. The court also stated: 
...This court will disturb the findings of 
fact in equity cases only where the evidence 
clearly preponderates against them... We are 
not bound to substitute our judgment for that 
of the trial court, and because of its 
advantages position, we give considerable 
deference to its findings and judgment.... 
In the case of In re Estate of Ruth H. Hock v. Jack M. Fennemore, 
655 P.2d 111 (Utah 1982) the court considered a case in which 
there was an allegation of a constructive trust. The court 
stated: 
In this case, as in most cases involving 
constructive or resulting trust, we are 
called upon to alter a deed or other writing 
which is regulated in form and is presumed to 
convey a clear and unambiguous title. When 
such a deed or document is attacked, the 
party alleging the variance must prove the 
claim by clear and convincing evidence.... 
The burden was upon the appellants to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the deed did not convey Fee Title to 
the respondents and/or that a constructive trust should be 
imposed on the property. The respondents admitted during the 
course of the trial that they had agreed that the appellants 
would have a life estate in the property. The court therefore 
concluded that the respondents owned the Fee Title subject only 
to a life estate in favor of the appellants. The appellants did 
not present any testimony that would invalidate the deed or place 
any restriction on the real property other than that agreed to by 
the respondents. The appellants do not contend in their Brief 
that they met the burden of producing clear and convincing 
evidence which would justify the invalidation of the deed. 
Instead the appellants attempt to switch the burden to the 
respondents as indicated in Point III of the appellants' Brief. 
The appellants' Brief claims that the appellants were 
not adequately compensated for the deed which they executed to 
the respondents. The appellants' Brief relies entirely upon the 
testimony of the appellants to support this contention. The 
Supreme Court has held in may cases that it will review the 
evidence presented in the trial court in the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party or the respondents. The evidence 
presented by the respondents as set forth in the Statement of 
Facts clearly demonstrates that the findings of the judge in 
favor of the respondents was supported by the evidence. 
The home which was quit claim deeded to the respondents 
was originally built at the suggestion of the respondent Barbara 
Sheron from $1,900.00 insurance money that she received from the 
death of her husband. (R.315) Barbara Sheron worked side by 
side with her father in constructing the home. (R.316-317) The 
appellants borrowed $4,500.00 to finish the home and Barbara 
Sheron paid the mortgage payment for a period of one year after 
the home was built although she and her new husband only lived in 
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the home for three months. (R.239, 318-319) After Barbara 
Sheron had stopped making the mortgage payments, the appellant 
Fanny Opheikens, because of her gambling, failed to make the 
payments on a regular basis thereby resulting in a threatened 
foreclosure by the mortgage holder. (R.282, Ex. 12) In order to 
keep the house from being foreclosed, the respondents paid 
$700.00 to the mortgage holder so that the mortgage would be 
reinstated. (R.364) Thereafter, in December of 1968 the 
mortgage holder again threatened to foreclose on the home because 
the appellants had not paid property taxes for a period of five 
years. (R.321-322) The respondents borrowed $1,028.00 and paid 
the taxes on the basis that the property would be deeded to them 
by the appellants. The Quit Claim Deed was drafted by the 
appellants' attorney. (R.368-369) After the property was deeded 
to the respondents, the respondents paid the insurance on the 
home and told the appellants they could continue to live in the 
home during their lifetime if they would pay the remaining 
mortgage and keep the taxes current on the home. (R.372-373, 
325-326) After the property was deeded to the respondents, they 
maintained the home and performed other improvements on the 
property for which they did not ask and did not receive 
compensation. (R.331-332, 374-375, 447) 
Judge Roth found that there was no good evidence before 
the court as to what the value of the home would have been in 
1967 and that the appellants did not present any evidence of 
value. The only evidence presented was the estimate of the 
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respondent Arthur Sheron that the home would have been worth 
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00 in 1967. The court also found from the 
evidence presented by the respondents that other homes in the 
area during this time period were selling for very modest 
amounts. (R.472-473) Judge Roth found that the respondents had 
contributed a total of $3,628.00 for the construction of the home 
and to avoid foreclosure on the home and concluded that this was 
a reasonable price given the fact that the appellants were 
receiving a life estate in the home. (R.472-473) 
In order to prevail on their Complaint, the appellants 
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was 
not valid or that it was being held in trust for them by the 
respondents. The appellants did not present any evidence to the 
effect that the property was being held in trust for them by the 
respondents. The appellant Joseph Opheikens was asked whether or 
not he had ever informed the respondents that he thought they 
were holding the ownership of the home in trust for him. His 
answer was no, that no discussion was ever had concerning the 
matter. (R.229) The appellants did not present any evidence 
that would justify their claim that the deed was invalid or that 
the respondents had been unjustly enriched. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD AND/OR 
MISCONSTRUED THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The appellants have appealed on the basis that the 
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trial court committed error in awarding the respondents a 
remainder interest in the property which they claim was not 
requested in the respondents' pleadings. There seems to be no 
other basis for the appeal. The appellants obviously have 
misconstrued the ruling of Judge Roth. Judge Roth found that the 
Fee Title to the land was transferred by Quit Claim Deed from the 
appellants to the respondents, but that the respondents had 
agreed to give the appellants a life estate in the property. 
Judge Roth stated in his decision from the bench that the 
respondents ended up with a remainder interest in the property. 
However, he did not award the respondents a remainder interest as 
alleged by the appellants. In fact the respondents, by agreeing 
to a life estate, retained a reversion interest. A remainder 
interest can only be created in favor of a stranger to the deed 
and therefore cannot apply to the respondents. Moynihah, 
Corneluis J., INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, p. Ill 
(West Publishing Company, 1962) While Judge Roth made reference 
to a remainder, he ruled that the respondents owned the fee to 
the real property subject only to a life estate in the appellants 
which legally created a reversion interest. While the 
distinction between the two interests are subtle, it is clear 
that the judge did not impose a constructive trust against the 
appellants which resulted in the respondents having a remainder 
interest. 
The appellants incorrect assumption that the court 
imposed a constructive trust upon the respondents runs throughout 
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the appellants1 Brief. Consequently, the arguments contained in 
the Brief are not relevant. This is demonstrated by Point II of 
the appellants' Brief wherein they contend that the respondents 
were granted relief which they did not request in their 
pleadings. The respondents at all times maintained that they 
were the fee owners of the property. Had the appellants 
understood the court's ruling, there would be no reason for the 
argument contained in Point II of the Brief. In Point I of the 
appellants' Brief, they argue that the imposition of a 
constructive trust in favor of the respondents has the effect of 
reconveying the real property or restoring the real property to 
the former owners or the appellants. The appellants then argue 
that the court did not reconvey the property to the appellants 
and therefore committed error in creating a constructive trust 
for the respondents. This argument makes no sense in light of 
the fact that the court held that the respondents were the fee 
owners of the property and that a constructive trust was imposed 
against the respondents in favor of the appellants in the form of 
a life estate. 
POINT III 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS ON APPEAL 
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. 
It is hard to tell from the appellants' Brief what 
relief they are asking of this court. The only part of the 
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appellants' Brief that addresses that issue is the conclusion. 
Apparently the appellants are not asking for a new trial, but are 
asking the court to reverse the trial court's decision and rule 
that the appellants own the Fee Title to the real property and 
that the only right the respondents have is to be paid back the 
moneys they have invested in the home. 
The Court of Appeals in an equity case does have the 
right to enter an order based upon the evidence given in the 
lower court. The Supreme Court has held that in the review of an 
equity case, the trial court's findings of fact and ruling should 
not be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the lower court ruling. Hock v. Fennemore, supra. The 
Supreme Court has also stated that considerable deference should 
be given to the findings of a trial court because of its 
advantaged position. Baker v. Pattee, supra. There is an 
additional reason why the court should not substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court in this case. 
It is the position of the respondents that the court 
committed error in a couple of instances in its decision in 
imposing a life estate in favor of the appellants. The 
respondents elected not to appeal on those issues because they 
were willing to allow the appellants to have a life estate in the 
property. 
It was the respondents' position that the appellants 
action was barred by the Statue of Limitations. The deed in this 
case was executed in 1967. The appellants did not instigate 
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their action until after 1984, more than 17 years after the date 
of the deed. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker v. 
Pattee, supra, held that the statute of limitations in an action 
for the cancelation of a deed was controlled by U.C.A. § 78-12-
25(2) which provides for a four year statute of limitations. The 
court stated that in case of undue influence and/or duress, the 
limitation period begins with the termination of the influence or 
duress. 
The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified that she was 
aware that the respondents did not intend to return the property 
to her as early as 1968. (R.298-299) The appellants did not claim 
that there was any undue influence or duress. The appellant 
Joseph Opheikens did not make any claim of a confidential 
relationship, undue influence, or duress. He stated that he did 
not tell the respondents that they were holding the house in 
trust for him. (R.229) His sole complaint was that he did not 
remember signing the deed and that the whole matter was a puzzle 
to him. (R.208, 221) The appellant Fanny Opheikens testified 
that when the deed was executed in 1967 she did not have a close 
relationship with her daughter, had an uncomfortable relationship 
with her son-in-law, and did not have a confidential relationship 
with either of the respondents. (R.295-296) She also stated that 
in 1967 she was approximately 60 years of age as was her husband 
and that both she and her husband were in good health and of 
clear mind. (R.297-298) Judge Roth found that there was no 
evidence that the respondents manipulated or put undue pressure 
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on the appellants. He also found that neither attempted to take 
advantage of the appellants. (R.470-471) 
It seems clear that the statute of limitations on 
this action began to run at the time the deed was executed, which 
was 1967, or when the appellants clearly knew that the 
respondents did not intend to return the property to them which 
would have been in 1968. Consequently, the appellants' action 
was barred by the statute of limitations after 1972. The 
respondents made a motion at the beginning and during the trial 
to dismiss the actions because of the statute of limitations. 
The court refused to grant the motion and stated: "...and for 
the reason I don't think it is a very satisfying way to end this 
litigation in a family case." (R.313) The respondents did not 
appeal from the court's failure to dismiss the case because of 
the statute of limitations because the respondents were willing 
to abide by the court's decision. However, if the Court of 
Appeals elects to overturn the court's decision and enter an 
order without referring the matter for a new trial, the 
respondents would be denied an opportunity to pursue a remedy 
which they might have appealed if any decision other than the one 
by Judge Roth was imposed upon them. 
The respondents believe that the court committed an 
error in ruling that a life estate was created by a constructive 
trust as opposed to an express trust. The respondents did not 
appeal from Judge Roth's ruling in this regard because they 
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agreed that there was an express trust and were willing to be 
bound by the life estate. At the conclusion of the case 
presented by the appellants, the respondents made a motion for a 
dismissal on the basis that the appellants had presented no 
evidence concerning an express trust. The appellants' attorney 
Stephen Farr conceded that they were not trying the action on the 
basis of an express trust, but rather on the theory of a 
constructive trust. Judge Roth ruled that there was no evidence 
that had been presented by the appellants that supported the 
existence of an express trust and granted the respondents' motion 
to dismiss on that basis. Judge Roth continued the trial solely 
on the theory of whether or not there was a constructive trust 
that should be imposed against the respondents. (R.273-276) Had 
the appellants called the respondents to testify as part of their 
case, they would have learned that there was an express trust; 
but since the appellants did not carry their burden, they lost 
the opportunity to prevail on that theory. 
The theory of constructive trust was considered by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Histsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 
1987). In that case Justice Zimmerman stated the burden of proof 
is on the party asserting a constructive trust to prove the case 
by clear and convincing evidence and that the burden of proving a 
constructive trust cannot be met by simply showing that there was 
a transaction between close family members. He stated that in 
order to impose a constructive trust, in addition to the family 
relationship, there must be shown age and infirmity, actual 
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dominance, a course of management of the affairs of another, or 
other facts making it inequitable to deny a constructive trust. 
He stated in part: 
.•.Indeed, the court was required to presume 
that the transaction was in all respects 
regular, absent evidence to the contrary.... 
A constructive trust cannot be imposed upon the 
respondents because there was a family relationship involved in 
this transaction. There was no evidence showing age or 
infirmity, actual dominance, a course of management of the 
affairs of another, or any other fact which would demonstrate 
that it was inequitable to deny a constructive trust. 
After dismissing the appellants' action on an express 
trust, Judge Roth continued the trial and heard the testimony of 
the respondents to the effect that they had agreed to give the 
appellants a life estate. Consequently, Judge Roth found himself 
in a position where he wanted to impose a life estate on the 
property, but could not do so because of an express trust. 
Therefore, he found there was a constructive trust imposing a 
life estate even though the evidence was not sufficient to 
justify such a finding. The appellants did not appeal this error 
on the part of the trial court because they believe the results 
were equitable. However, if this court were to substitute its 
order for that of the trial court, a result could occur which was 
not anticipated by the respondents and the respondents would be 
denied an opportunity to pursue a remedy which they might have 
otherwise appealed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondents are the owners of the Fee Title to the 
property in question by reason of a Quit Claim Deed from the 
appellants. The appellants did not sustain their burden of 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the deed 
given to the respondents was invalid or that the property was 
being held in trust for the appellants. The trial court did not 
impose upon the appellants a constructive trust resulting in a 
remainder interest in the respondents as alleged by the 
appellants. The court clearly ruled that the respondents owned 
the Fee Title to the property subject only to a life estate in 
the appellants. This resulted in the respondents having a 
reversion interest in the property instead of a remainder 
interest as alleged by the appellants. 
The relief sought by the appellants is not clear. 
However, it would be manifestly unjust for the Court of Appeals 
to substitute its ruling for that of the trial court. The 
respondents believe that the trial court committed an error in 
failing to dismiss the action as being barred by the statute of 
limitations and in determining that there was a constructive 
trust imposed against the respondents for a life estate in favor 
of the appellants. The respondents' did not appeal these issues 
because they believe the ultimate result of the court's order was 
equitable. However, if the appellate court were to substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court, the respondents would 
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be denied an opportunity to pursue remedies which they might have 
appealed if the decision had been other than as rendered by the 
trial judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1989. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondents 
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